This article considers the national treatment standard in international investment agreements as implemented by emerging market countries. It briefly explains the nature and purpose of the standard and how it has been examined by international investment tribunals. Specific examples of national treatment provisions in emerging market international investment treaties as well as WTO instruments are discussed, focusing the scope and limitations to this standard commonly provided in treaty practice. The associated issue of performance requirements is then considered. The article concludes that whereas the national treatment standard is found in most but not all emerging market investment treaties, it is often limited by scope or application, although a trend towards greater liberalization is noted.
I Introduction
Foreign direct investment to developing countries comprised 45 per cent of the world's total foreign direct investment ('FDI') flows in 2011, a rise of 11 per cent over the previous year. 1 This considerable increase was lead by large economies such Brazil, India, China and Russia as well as upcoming giants such as Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey.
2 Such countries are often described as "emerging markets" because they have high rates of economic growth, typically well beyond those enjoyed by developed countries, rising GDPs and a burgeoning middle class.
Taken together these factors represent an attractive target for foreign firms seeking new foreign investors relative to local investors a vital instrument for safeguarding the expectation of high-risk commercial projects overseas. 9 While it eradicates discrimination against foreign investors on the basis of the nationality of ownership of an investment and in so doing should encourage FDI, the national treatment standard is a double-edged sword because it harbours the potential for deep encroachment on national sovereignty. Precluding favouritism towards local firms can undermine a host country's capacity to govern not simply its own economy, but possibly many aspects of domestic social policy that may be affected by the presence of foreign firms, such as national security, culture and even indigenous rights.
This article will examine the use of the national treatment standard by emerging market countries in their IIAs, including investment-related instruments administered through the World Trade Organization ('WTO'). It will begin by very briefly outlining the nature of the national treatment standard in international investment law and will then turn to some examples of how these clauses have been used by emerging markets in their investment treaties, examining first the scope of the clause and then common ways in which it is limited. The article will then consider the closely related issue of performance requirements which typically discriminate against foreign firms in a manner that could engage national treatment obligations. It must be acknowledged from the outset that generalizations about the treaty practice of emerging market countries must be approached with caution for two principal reasons. First, there is an enormous variation in economic size and developmental status among countries that could fit within the category "emerging" with China and India being perhaps the two most conspicuous outliers. As such it is difficult to infer much less identify consistent policy objectives towards FDI. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the contents of IIAs pursued by developing countries, especially historically, has more often been dictated by the powerful developed partner country, rather than indicative of a strategic approach by the relevant developing state to the national treatment standard or investment treaties generally.
II The National Treatment Standard In International Investment Law
The application of the national treatment standard in international investment law requires a comparison between treatment accorded to foreign investors and domestic investors by host states. In order for this comparison to be legally meaningful the relevant investors must be in similar or "like" circumstances. Some older IIAs had used the phrase "situations" instead of "circumstances" although it is not clear that there is a difference between the two concepts.
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Whether or not foreign and domestic investors can be seen to be in "like" circumstances will depend on the nature of the investment and the investors. The way in which this analysis is conducted by investment tribunals which interpret international investment instruments remains controversial. More specifically, it is unclear whether the standard requires that foreign and domestic investors are in exactly the same business or simply the same industry or sector.
Clearly a large multinational corporation is very different from a small local operator, suggesting that differential treatment between such entities should not be viewed as discrimination. 11 The size of a business entity often signifies its capacity to engage in abusive market practices, such as predatory pricing, which may be viewed as a justification for discrimination irrespective of nationality. However discrimination based upon an investor's size, while not necessarily intending to disadvantage foreign investors, may result in a national treatment violation because in many developing countries, although less so the big emerging markets, large investors will most likely be exclusively foreign. It appears that de facto discrimination should be sufficient to find a national treatment violation.
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Crucially the test for "likeness" for national treatment purposes in the investment context is different than that of the trade context, as seen in the WTO's General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ('GATT') in particular, where a comparison between "like products" is specified.
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The unique nature of the national treatment test in international investment law was illustrated by a the arbitration tribunal in the Methanex v USA decision under the investment provisions in the North American Free Trade Agreement ('NAFTA'). That tribunal held that the foreign investor did not receive less favourable treatment than a similarly placed domestic investor in that instance. This was because although the relevant law did discriminate against the production of different types of chemicals (ethanol and methanol) the regulation did not discriminate between methanol producers themselves. international law is seen in the commonly used words "no less favourable", acknowledging that other rules may be more favourable than those found in domestic law. In this sense, positive differentiation remains possible and will even be obligatory where the general standards of international law are higher than those applying to domestic entities. 28 Denial of this entitlement to "better than national treatment" was a central component of the Calvo Doctrine which theorized that foreigners should receive formally identical treatment to nationals, notably by using the host state's dispute settlement mechanisms rather than international ones, just as any domestic investor would do. 29 The practical effect of the national treatment standard embracing an international minimum standard is that in some respects foreign investors are effectively placed in a position superior to that of their domestic equivalents. Again this is seen most notably where IIAs grant foreign investors access to remedies through international investment tribunals. This can be advantageous because such systems are often less expensive, confidential
and not plagued by corruption. Bypassing local courts is problematic also because it could transgress the constitution of some host states, particularly in treaties where there is no requirement of prior exhaustion of local remedies.
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In addition to its status as a stand-alone obligation, national treatment's prohibition of discrimination against foreigners in international investment law can also be found implicitly in the guarantees against expropriation which are common to IIAs. In order for an expropriation to be considered lawful it must not be discriminatory, meaning that it must not be performed against foreign investors simply because of they are foreign. (another re-iteration of the Calvo Doctrine) is similarly an embodiment of the national treatment standard. This type of compensation, as distinct from the more common Hull Formula of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation, was historically asserted by developing states, 32 and can still be seen in some Latin American IIAs.
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III National Treatment Guarantees in Emerging Market IIAs
As noted above, national treatment is a treaty made standard that does not exist in customary international law on its own. It is a standard defined by reference to the treaty in which it appears which in turn dictates how the national laws relating to relevant economic activities must be written and applied. likely because these large developed states did not fear competition from emerging market firms.
Some regional trade agreements ('RTA')s that include investment provisions signed by emerging markets contain pre-establishment national treatment, 37 possibly because the economic power of these Member states perceived as more equal. The more common appearance of preestablishment national treatment in IIAs has been described as a "revolution" because it represents a fundamental form of international economic integration. 38 This extreme form of liberalization may become more popular among the emerging world as these firms seek to engage more aggressively in outward FDI. Generally speaking there has been an increased emphasis on granting national treatment at both the pre-establishment and post-establishment phase of the investment, a phenomenon that has been linked to economic globalization. 39 This 36 E.g. Canada-South Africa Art III.1 b) (signed 27 November 1995) 37 E.g. Japan-Singapore RTA Art 73 (signed 13 January 2002) 38 UNCTAD, above note 7 at 3-4 39 Sornarajah above note 11 at 335, who also asserts that the appearance of pre-establishment national treatment is the consequence of the acceptance of neo-liberal views, at 336. may indicate growing parity between the developed and developing world in terms of their capacity to export capital.
The scope of application of the national treatment standard is typically expressed in IIAs under the heading Treatment of Investment. It is not customary for treaties to state explicitly that the national treatment standard is extended only to the post-establishment phase of investment.
The scope of application of the national treatment standard may also be controlled by the definition of investment or investor as specified under the IIA, with the various protections applying only to those activities that fit within the definition so proscribed. As will be discussed further below, countries often exclude specific sectors from national treatment coverage, which may explain why pre-establishment national treatment has begun to appear at all in IIAs. It is important to note that there has yet to be an investment arbitration award that has considered a state's violation of a pre-establishment national treatment guarantee. It is difficult to imagine on what basis the compensation for such a treaty breach would be, given that the injured investor would have no record of operation in the host state, rendering any claim of lost profits highly speculative.
A standard example of a national treatment clause employed by an emerging market that covers only post-establishment is that of South Africa's BIT with Canada which states that each party shall permit the establishment of an investment on conditions no less favourable than that granted to its own investors or prospective investors in like circumstances. 40 state to screen foreign investments through their own national laws, including those relating to crime and national security as well as those governing certain sectors or the economy generally.
The India-Sweden BIT states that the obligation to admit foreign investments is subject not only to its laws and regulations, but also to its "general policy in the field of foreign investment" 51 which appears to grant host states greater latitude to restrict entry, even if this power is not contained in official legislation. Similar language is seen in Malaysia's BIT with Germany, which specifies that national treatment will be extended "unless stipulations made in the document of admission provide otherwise" 52 effectively granting host states the complete discretion to abandon the treaty's national treatment standard as required.
While uncommon, pre-establishment national treatment can be found in some emerging 63 This "positive list" approach to investment liberalization is different than that of NAFTA, for example, which uses a "negative list" (national treatment in all sectors except those which are specifically excluded) and which is specified in the OECD Liberalization Codes which may be seen as useful guides for emerging markets. It is thought that the negative list format, in which the default is pre-establishment national treatment is more conducive to achieving investment liberalization, but developing countries have tended to favour the GATS positive list approach because it is more gradual, requiring further negotiation and as such is less intrusive.
The negative list technique, seen in the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Treaty, requires that the country be able to assess its capacity to absorb FDI as well as the ability of its domestic firms to withstand foreign competition in particular sectors ex ante.
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The WTO's plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement ('GPA'), which currently has only 14 signatories, including the emerging markets Israel, Singapore and Chinese Tapei, contains a national treatment guarantee that is relevant to international investment.
Article III:2 of the GPA states that signatories "shall not treat a locally-established supplier of a governmental service less favourably than another locally-established supplier on the basis of their degree of foreign ownership or affiliation." This provision ensures that host states do not unfairly prejudice foreign firms seeking to supply goods or services to governments, again allowing the most efficient provider to obtain the tender or contract on the basis of their competitiveness, not their foreign character. The GPA is structured in a positive-list manner that allows signatories to list which sectors or industries in which they are willing to extend commitments under the agreement, often by reference to specific agencies within the central and National treatment is also lacking entirely from some Philippine, 68 and earlier Chinese 69 IIAs.
This approach clearly reflects a high level of caution with regards to foreign capital. Granting national treatment protection to foreign investors was difficult for some emerging markets such as China given the dominance of state-owned enterprises in its economy. On the other hand Russia, which has an economy that is also dominated by state-owned enterprises, has specifically included the favourable treatment accorded to its state owned enterprises in the definition of national treatment in some IIAs. 70 This approach may reflect Russia's desire to attract foreign capital to exploit fully its natural resources. While excluding national treatment entirely could discourage many foreign investors, this strategy clearly allows host states to retain maximum control over their own economies and to extend preferential treatment to their own firms, allowing them to withstand competition from often more advanced foreign entrants and to grant preferential treatment to specific industries or firms.
ii) Exceptions to National Treatment
States may structure IIAs to grant them the power to deny national treatment at any stage of investment. In order for foreign investors to understand precisely how they will be regulated by host states it is usually further necessary to examine domestic legislation governing the foreign investment process. Of course these regulations must conform to obligations made in international instruments. Most IIAs contain lists of the types of matters that are excluded from the coverage of the instrument's protection, allowing the host country to enact discriminatory laws in fields because of justifications linked to health, public order or the environment. 71 It should be clarified that it is not the aim of this article to consider exceptions to IIA commitments generally but rather to consider those limitations expressly placed on national treatment obligations as seen in emerging market IIA practice.
Including a list of exceptions to national treatment, and other treaty guarantees, is a relatively recent phenomenon in international investment law, thought to have been derived from the first US Model BIT. 72 Even in the absence of specific limitations in the text of an IIA it is widely accepted that some differentiation between domestic and foreign investors is acceptable if rational grounds are demonstrated. 73 The precise nature of these justifications has been a source of agitation for a number of investment tribunals. 74 In the special context of emerging markets, the developmental status of the host state may also influence the perceived legitimacy of any such justifications in line with the principle of special and differential treatment seen in public international law. 75 The extent to which developmental status can legitimately apply to the large 71 Many IIAs specifically adopt the language of the General Exceptions contained in the GATS Art XIV, e.g. Cyprus specifies that parties reserve the right to make limited exceptions to national treatment guarantees in accordance with their own legislation, allowing maximum policy flexibility. 76 Russia's BIT with Egypt specifies that each contract party has the right to determine the branches of the economy and spheres of activity in which activity by foreign investors is excluded or restricted. 77 A similar limitation appears in the Russian BIT with Japan, which includes the additional requirement that these restricted spheres of activity must be notified to the other party. 78 Investments that do not maintain a significant commercial presence in the host are specifically excluded from national treatment protections in some Russian IIAs, 79 preventing foreign investors from using Russian as an artificial home state to take advantage of Russian
IIAs with other countries where the investor might have operations but no treaty. Russia's BIT with Germany permits discrimination against foreign investors taken on the grounds of "law, order and security, morality or public health." 80 These broad exceptions to national treatment are also found in the BIT with Sweden, which additionally makes reference to unspecified "limited exceptions" to national treatment that may be maintained by contracting parties.
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Singapore's BIT with Jordan specifies that parties may maintain limitations to national treatment in relation to any sectors or matters to be covered by later annexes. 82 Likewise
Vietnam's BIT with Japan includes an Annex that lists forms of economic activity that are excluded from national treatment, with each country listing its own exclusions, with Vietnam's exclusions tending to focus on services industries. 83 As noted above this negative list strategy allows states room to control inward investment in sectors that may not be able to withstand full competition.
Brazilian IIAs contain numerous exceptions to national treatment guarantees. regions. While subsidies are viewed by most economists as economically inefficient, 88 some forms of subsidy are less damaging to international trade and investment than others, with those linked to export performance being the most harmful. As such retaining some degree of discretion with respect to subsidies may be seen as a key economic tool for emerging markets.
Discrimination against foreign investors is often justified by host states on the basis that foreign investment represents a risk to national security. Indeed, Russia's BIT with Thailand specifically permits parties to introduce exceptions to national treatment for the purpose of "national security and public order."
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Although such provisions typically do not occur expressly in conjunction with the national treatment guarantee in IIAs, national security exemptions may be seen as a derogations from the national treatment guarantee in as much as they are often phrased so as to permit host states to depart from all obligations contained in a treaty: "nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from taking any action which it considers to be in its essential security interest." 90 The concern for national security is especially common in industries related to vital infrastructure such as telecommunications, finance and transportation because of the fear that foreign influences could de-stabilize a country's critical infrastructure.
National security exceptions in IIAs are a special category of restriction because they are often phrased using the above indicated "self-judging" language. This allows the host state to determine when it considers its national security to be under threat. South African IIAs do not make explicit reference to these policies in their IIAs, however it may be possible to fit these forms of positive discrimination within general public policy exceptions to national treatment found in IIAs such as those referring to public order.
IV National Treatment and Performance Requirements
Performance requirements are conditions placed upon foreign investors by host sates so that they are permitted to enter and establish themselves in host states and carry on business there. These requirements are aimed at ensuring that the foreign investors engage in commercial activity that is economically advantageous to the host state. foreign investors that entry and establishment can be made contingent upon activities that are in the exclusive interest of the host country and may impinge upon the foreign investor's freedom.
V Conclusion
National treatment is one of the foundational principles of international investment law, as it is with many other branches of international economic law, notably international trade and is a key Specifically excluding a broad range of sectors from post-establishment national treatment is rare in modern emerging market IIAs, demonstrating their eagerness to attract FDI through a generally applicable guarantee of non-discrimination. Based on the reciprocal nature of these agreements, this move towards greater liberalization and protection may signify equally that emerging markets now seek to ensure that their own investors enjoy the advantages of national treatment in foreign markets.
